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ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this project is to conduct independent research to determine the 
optimal types and quantities of next generation logistics ships (NGLS) required to meet 
future intra-theater survivable logistics demand. This research addresses these 
requirements through the logistical lens of refueling. Capabilities and limitations have 
been identified via top-level requirements necessary to meet the future joint naval 
concepts of distributed military operations, littorals in a contested environment, and 
expeditionary advanced base operations. Research in support of the NGLS force analysis 
is centered on capacity, capability, employment, and distribution. This research assumes 
that commodities will be required both afloat and ashore in contested regions. The project 
uses elements of literature review and modeling to determine the optimal type and 
quantity of platforms capable of meeting the forecasted demand. This research 
recommends an optimal solution focused on minimizing the number of resupply missions 
within the contested regions. The project expands on potential information and bias gaps 
that may have been overlooked by the project sponsor at the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (OPNAV N4). 
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The Department of Defense (DOD) is the largest consumer of energy in the United 
States and is the world’s largest international user of petroleum (Crawford, 2019). As such, 
fuel is imperative to the DOD’s mission to enable the “combat-credible military forces 
needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation” (Mattis, 2018, p. 1). In order to 
continue this advantage over our advancing near-peer adversaries of China and Russia, the 
U. S. Navy and Marine Corps team need to reexamine the way that fuel is distributed in a 
maritime environment. Currently, our maritime logistics force is lacking in its ability to 
sustain the force in a multi-domain fight of tomorrow based on the Navy and Marine Corps 
future operating concepts. As it stands, “the Government-owned sealift fleet is rapidly 
approaching a capacity cliff” (Walton et al., 2019, p. ii), which directly equates to shortfalls 
in maritime logistic operations. The National Defense Strategy prioritizes “resilient and 
agile logistics” (Mattis, 2018, p. 7) as one of eight capabilities necessary to maintain our 
competitive advantage. The technological advancements of our adversaries enable them to 
track our logistic footprints. If they have the ability to stop our forces from being resupplied 
due to our old paradigm of large logistic bases, then an “unsupported force may quickly 
become a defeated one” (Walton et al., 2019, p. i). This capabilities shortfall leads up to 
the question: How many platform supply vessels (PSVs), fast supply vessels (FSVs), and 
light amphibious warships (LAWs) will the joint maritime force need to meet the 
forecasted demand necessary to sustain the Navy and Marine Corps in a contested 
environment? 
This study attempts to provide an optimal solution to this problem. The model is 
set up to develop a framework for the employment of next generation logistics ships 
(NGLSs) in support of future naval operations that match the demand and architecture of 
distributed military operations (DMO). The output provides a recommendation of the 
optimal quantity and vessel type of NGLS assets. The end state of the project is to provide 
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N4) with an independent, data-driven 
recommendation on the optimal NGLS composition necessary to support their forecasted 
DMO and expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO). 
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A. BACKGROUND 
The expanded military presence of Russia and China within the great-power 
competition has led to significantly increased military capabilities. The Navy and Marine 
Corps must reexamine their ability to sustain and survive a future conflict where the 
adversary has a decided advantage in interior lines of communications and near peer-level 
lethality. China has been strategic in their positioning within the South China Sea, Russia 
has been bullying the neighbors of their borders, and North Korea has been continuing to 
act like outlaws (Mattis, 2018). “The last time the United States confronted a competitor 
with the economic capacity, global maritime infrastructure, and naval power of China was 
over two hundred years ago” (Haynes, 2020, p. 106). As seen with the current state of a 
heightened contested environment, the enemy can challenge American freedom of 
movement and can attack amphibious forces well before they arrive in the area of 
operations (AO). This forces the U.S. military to rethink its method of resupplying forces 
within the weapons engagement zone (WEZ). The Navy and Marine Corps need to be 
innovative and creative in posturing and sustaining amphibious forces. Sustainment 
capabilities must be responsive to maneuvering forces engaged with the enemy, and they 
must be protected from adversary actions across all warfighting domains. The evolving 
character of war indicates that future conflicts may be fought over greater distances, 
stretching sustainment capabilities. These factors illustrate the importance of emerging 
technologies in efforts to create more efficient supply chains, which are necessary in 
sustaining amphibious operations within the WEZ. The Navy and Marine Corps need to 
counter their sustainment challenge of iron mountains. This can be done by fielding more 
capabilities within vessels that operate inside a contested environment. These actions will 
require a shared Navy and Marine Corps vision that integrates Navy and Marine Corps 
operating concepts and an understanding of how maritime logistics need to evolve in order 
to avoid a culminating point. 
1. Navy and Marine Corps Vision 
The National Security Strategy sets a strong tone; while the United States is 
currently the strongest military force in the world, the advantages that the nation has been 
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accustomed to for so long are now dwindling because competitors are no longer temporary 
problems but rather sustained long-term threats (Mattis, 2018). As it is now and has forever 
been the United States’ commitment to protect the American people, it is more important 
than ever to do this through an integrated naval force (Mattis, 2018). Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) Admiral Mike Gilday and Commandant of the Marine Corps General 
David Berger both have communicated visions, concepts, and shortfalls that can be 
mitigated through an integrated force’s ability to fight, dominate, and win as a team. ADM 
Gilday expressed with great emphasis the importance of a unified Navy and Marine Corps 
team in his military strategy:   
A Navy that is ready to win across the full range of military operations. We 
must have a Fleet that is manned, trained, equipped, integrated, and ready 
to meet requirements of our senior leaders at any time. Alongside the 
Marine Corps, the Navy will deliver decisive Integrated American Naval 
Power. (Gilday, 2019, p. 1)  
According to the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment, the Navy will need 355 
ships within its fleet to meet the capabilities that the combatant commanders deem 
necessary to continue leveraging maritime superiority (O’Rourke, 2020). However, that 
need for decisive American naval power forced a once-in-a-generation change; in the 
Integrated Force Structure Assessment, 390 ships were requested to address the shortfall 
within the fleet architecture, which will be necessary to combat the nation’s near-peer 
adversaries (O’Rourke, 2020). This requested adjustment aligns with the vision to win 
across all military domains. 
The Marine Corps is getting back to its roots as a Fleet Marine Force (FMF) and is 
reinforcing its commitment of seizing or defending advanced naval bases to support the 
overall naval campaign (Title 10). GEN Berger expressed his vision in his Commandant’s 
Planning Guidance that 
the focal point of the future integrated naval force will shift from traditional 
power projection to meet the new challenges associated with maintaining a 
persistent naval forward presence to enable sea control and denial 
operations. The Fleet Marine Force (FMF) will support the Joint Force 
Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and fleet commander concept of 
operations, especially in close and confined seas, where enemy long-range 
precision fires threaten maneuver by traditional large-signature naval 
4 
platforms. Future naval force development and employment will include 
new capabilities that will ensure that the Navy-Marine Corps team cannot 
be excluded from any region in advancing or protecting our national 
interests or those of our allies. (Headquarters Marine Corps [HQMC], 2019, 
p. 2) 
To meet this end state, it is imperative that commanders are provided a competitive 
advantage to operate, maneuver, and destroy the enemy within the so-called gray zone 
(HQMC, 2020). This vision starts with the alignment and advancement of military 
concepts, DMO, littoral operations in a contested environment (LOCE), and EABO. These 
concepts are a foundational element for creating and sustaining the advantage in a future 
fight. 
2. Concepts of Operations in a Contested Environment 
The advancing threat of our near-peer adversaries creates strategic implications for 
how the Navy and Marine Corps team plans to evolve and posture the force to enable rapid 
engagements for maritime superiority. This capability can be summarized in this way: “In 
the short term, a maritime strategy is about buying time to find advantages, mobilize one’s 
industrial and innovation bases, and extend the enemy’s perimeter” (Haynes, 2020, p. 104). 
Currently, three main concepts provide this type of advantage through a supported/
supporting relationship between the Navy and Marine Corps team to be able to execute 
within the adversary’s WEZ: DMO, LOCE, and EABO. These three concepts are tailored 
and “designed to complicate enemy targeting and enable naval forces to concentrate fires 
on enemy forces” (Clark & Walton, 2019, p. 21). These concepts allow for the forces to be 
integrated through a network, which creates the ability to counter adversary forces of sea 
denial and sea control. 
a. Distributed Military Operations  
DMO is the overarching, prominent naval concept for theater-level operations that 
creates a new paradigm of maritime dominance through a distributed architecture (Clark 
& Walton, 2019). This architecture forms the ability for the U.S. naval force to shape the 
necessary conditions required to operate and support forces in a contested environment. 
This architecture is provided to the Navy with three essential components: (a) integrated 
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command relationships, (b) strong mission command, and (c) applied risk acceptance of 
the overall naval scheme of maneuver (Corbett, 2018).  
b. Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment  
LOCE is the direct unified effort between the Navy and Marine Corps integrated 
mission. As part of the Marine Corps Operating Concept, this is very important because 
the adversary’s capabilities can extend the depth and AO known as the littorals. The 
littorals are  
comprised of two segments. The seaward portion is that area from the open 
ocean to the shore that must be controlled to support operations ashore. The 
landward portion is the area inland from the shore that can be supported and 
defended directly from the sea. ( U. S. Marine Corps [USMC] Concepts and 
Programs, 2018, p. 1)  
Controlling the littorals creates the unified network necessary to project maritime power. 
c. Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations  
EABO directly complements LOCE to achieve the principal DMO strategy because 
it enables the naval force “to persist forward within the arc of adversary long-range 
precision fires to support our treaty partners with combat credible forces on a much more 
resilient and difficult to target forward basing infrastructure” (O’Rourke, 2020, p. 24). 
EABO creates an opportunity to establish an inside force through sea control and sea denial 
that is operationally relevant while maintaining low signatures (Corbett, 2018). This 
persistent and temporary presence is essential in order to gain and maintain a foothold 
within the adversary’s WEZ. 
3. Maritime Logistics  
To ensure that the innovative paradigm shift of these new concepts is feasible, 
maritime logistic technologies, capabilities, and capacities need to inherently match the 
architecture required to align with the National Defense Strategy. The National Defense 
Strategy states, “The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one” (Mattis, 2018, 
p. 5). During World War II, the United States was prepared with thousands of vessels that 
allowed for many strong fronts to support and resupply the Allies and defeat the enemy 
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(Walton et al., 2019). After the Cold War, the maritime environment was largely 
uncontested (USMC Concepts and Programs, 2018). This created an unintended 
consequence over decades because “the Navy and Marine Corps were able to focus on the 
capabilities that support maritime power projection unfettered by a corresponding need to 
fully invest in those capabilities required to establish sea control” (USMC Concepts and 
Programs, 2018, p. 1). Due to the U. S. Navy logistics platforms being one to two 
generations removed from World War II, they have been focused solely on minimizing 
costs because they are designed to be utilized in a secure and uncontested environment 
(Walton et al., 2019). 
Presently, the Navy has 29 ships within the Combat Logistics Force (CLF), which 
supports the mission of replenishment at sea (RAS; Walton et al., 2019). This is 
strategically important because it allows for an extended range of military operations at sea 
without having to come back to port. The construct of this hub- and- spoke process has 
been successful for decades, but as adversaries increase capabilities and range through 
advancing technology, this process becomes quickly insufficient. Due to these ships being 
soft targets with relatively limited means to defend themselves, the Navy cannot afford 
high attrition of these assets within the battlespace (Walton et al., 2019).  
Currently, the naval force structure is not postured to support the Navy and Marine 
Corps vision, nor is it prepared to support and resupply the concepts of DMO, LOCE, and 
EABO. Our legacy fleet is vulnerable when operated within the parameters of the WEZ. 
This is imperative to the force because  
many times, in history, military campaigns have been cut short, if for 
nothing else, a lack of logistical foresight. We want to ensure that this does 
not occur in the planning factors used to calculate fuel requirements in 
execution of U.S. Navy operations afloat. (Long, 2011, p. 2) 
These calculated risks inherently increase as the force attempts to overcome the tyranny of 




A 2019 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) report states, 
The current and programmed defense maritime logistics force of the United 
States is inadequate to support the current U.S. National Defense Strategy 
and major military operations against China or Russia. The Summary of the 
2018 National Defense Strategy specifically highlights “resilient and agile 
logistics” as one of eight capability areas that need to be strengthened to 
prepare the United States for an era of renewed great power competition. 
(Walton et al., 2019, p. i) 
The purpose of this project is to provide OPNAV N4 with an independent, data-
driven recommendation on the optimal NGLS composition necessary to support their 
forecasted DMO and EABO framework. Results are calculated via a scalable 
transshipment model utilizing OPNAV N4’s forecasted demand. The model focuses 
specifically on intra-theater fuel requirements of ashore and afloat assets within the WEZ. 
The project’s end state is to provide OPNAV N4 with an unbiased recommendation on the 
specific number and type of NGLS vessels to assist in the planning, acquisition, and 
budgeting process of NGLS platforms. 
1. Objectives 
This report aims to meet the following objectives: 
• Provide a capabilities overview of the three vessels being considered for 
the Navy’s intra-theater NGLS family, including the PSV, FSV, and 
LAW. 
• Analyze each vessel’s capabilities at both the threshold and objective level 
as defined by each vessel’s top-level requirements (TLRs). Threshold 
equals minimum acceptable value; objective equals desired goal. The 
difference between the threshold and objective values sets the trade space 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Sustainment. [OUSD A&S], 2018). 
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• Identify Jet Propellant-5 (JP-5) fuel requirements of afloat and ashore 
assets operating within the WEZ as forecasted by OPNAV N4.  
• Create a transshipment model to identify the optimal NGLS family mix 
(via type and quantity of each vessel) required to meet demand and 
minimize deliveries within the WEZ. 
• Provide sufficient details to understand the objectives of and the 
constraints within the model. 
• Provide OPNAV N4 with recommendations on the ideal NGLS 
composition to aid in the planning and acquisition process. 
2. Scope 
As Naval Sea Systems Command outlined in its industry day announcement posted 
on May 15, 2020, 
the NGLS will enable refueling, rearming, and resupply of Naval assets—
afloat and ashore—in support of Distributed Maritime Operations, Littoral 
Operations Contested Environment, and Expeditionary Advanced Base 
Operations. The NGLS is envisioned to be smaller than existing ships in the 
Combat Logistics Force, and will operate near contested environments, 
sustaining afloat (Surface Action Group) and ashore (Expeditionary 
Advanced Base) requirements. (Naval Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA], 
2020) 
In order to keep the project aligned with NGLS acquisition goals, this model 
assumes the following parameters: 
1. Demand is limited to fulfilling requirements from surface action groups 
(SAGs) and expeditionary advanced bases (EABs). SAG equates to afloat 
demand; EAB equates to ashore demand. 
2. Demand for one SAG is comprised of three guided missile destroyers 
(DDGs) and one littoral combat ship (LCS), or three DDGs and one 
frigate guided missile destroyer (FFG[X]). 
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3. EAB demand is broken down by specific EAB type, which includes anti-
surface warfare (ASuW) strike units, short take off and vertical landing 
(STOVL) forward arming and refueling point (FARP) units, and maritime/
naval logistics units. 
4. All fuel requirements—including ship, aviation, and ground—are 
consolidated into a single fuel requirement, JP-5, per OPNAV N4 
guidance. 
5. Ship selection is limited to the NGLS family of PSV, FSV, and LAW. 
Each vessel is considered equally survivable on their specified arcs within 
the model.  
6. PSVs cannot service EABs due to docking requirements. 
7. The CLF remains outside the WEZ and is the sole replenishment node 
from which NGLS assets draw fuel. (In this report, a node indicates a 
point of supply, a point of demand, or a transshipment point.) 
8. Replenishment of CLF assets is outside the scope of the project; therefore, 
fuel supply at the CLF is considered unconstrained. 
9. Vessel capacity is constrained by delivery capacity, which is calculated by 
the fuel transfer rate capable within a specified time window. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The NGLS family consists of three specific platforms: the FSV, the PSV, and the 
LAW. All three platforms leverage industry innovation and expertise by largely utilizing 
commercial off the shelf (COTS) parent ship designs to accelerate fielding and acquisition. 
According to NAVSEA (2020), “The NGLS is planned to be a new class of ships to 
augment the current CLF ships, through the use of commercial ship designs tailored for 
military applications to conduct logistics missions.”  
The NGLS family can be broken down into two distinct subgroups: the PSV/FSV 
and the LAW. The PSV and the FSV are strictly logistics platforms that lack armament or 
survivability modifications. They are civilian crewed and lack any ability to provide direct 
conveyance to beaches.  
The LAW, as its name implies, is the most survivable and militarily capable of the 
three platforms. It is a multipurpose, light warship that serves in both logistics and 
warfighting capacities. The LAW is the only beach-able platform capable of providing 
direct conveyance for onload and off-load of expeditionary forces, equipment, and 
supplies. It is designated as a risk-worthy asset that prioritizes survivability for its crew and 
embarked forces against proportional threats (United States Navy [USN], 2020b). 
In accordance with the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System 
(JCIDS), each vessel has TLRs that must be satisfied to meet the vessels’ operational goals. 
Each TLR is broken down into two categories: threshold (T) values and objective (O) 
values. Per the 2018 JCIDS manual, 
Thresholds, Objectives, and Tradespace. Sponsors shall express 
performance attributes using a threshold/objective format. They are chosen 
to be technically achievable, quantifiable, measurable, testable, 
unambiguous, supported by documented trade-off analysis, and defined in 
a manner that supports efficient and effective training and evaluation. 
Thresholds. Performance below the threshold value is not operationally 
effective or suitable or may not provide any improvement over current 
capabilities. 
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Objectives. The objective values are applicable when a higher level of 
performance represents significant increase in operational utility. If 
applicable, the objective value is the desired operational goal achievable, 
but at higher risk in life cycle cost, schedule, and technology. Performance 
above the objective value does not justify additional expense. 
Tradespace. The difference between threshold and objective values sets the 
trade space for balancing multiple performance attributes while remaining 
above the threshold values. (OUSD A&S, 2018, p. B-G-3) 
A. PLATFORM SUPPLY VESSEL  
The PSV, an example of which is shown in Figure 1, is a dedicated logistics vessel 
with the greatest fuel capacity and slowest speed in the NGLS family. It is civilian crewed 
and nonbeach-able, and it cannot provide direct support to ashore EABs within the WEZ. 
Its design is very similar to current PSV designs used by the offshore oil and gas industry 
(USN, 2019b). 
 
Figure 1. Example of a Commercial PSV. Source: Snyder (2019). 
The PSV’s core mission is to provide logistics support to afloat assets within the 
WEZ. In order to meet afloat demand, the PSV draws supplies from the CLF (outside the 
WEZ) and delivers to afloat assets inside the WEZ: SAGs, LAWs, and FSVs. The PSV is 
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capable of sustained speeds up to 13 knots with a range up to 4,000 nautical miles. Its cargo 
fuel tank capacity ranges from approximately 18,000 to 28,000 barrels (bbl) of JP-5 and 
can deliver up to 5,260 bbl per hour to afloat assets. The vessel must be capable of 
replenishing cargo, ammunition, and fuel at sea from the CLF (USN, 2019b). Support for 
EABs is indirectly supported via the pass-through demand at the transshipment node (USN, 
2019b).  
B. FAST SUPPLY VESSEL  
The FSV is the smallest and most agile vessel in the family. It too is merchant 
manned, but due to its speed and agility, it is considered risk worthy to replenish ashore-
based EABs (USN, 2019a). An example of a potential prototype is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Render of Potential FSV Design. Source: Swiftships (2020). 
The FSV’s small footprint allows for an exceptionally fast and nimble vessel. Its 
core mission is performing logistics runs within the WEZ. It has minimal range and crew 
endurance, so missions consist of receiving supplies from PSVs or LAWs within the WEZ 
and delivering to ashore EABs also within the WEZ. The FSV is capable of sustained 
speeds up to 26 knots with a range up to 1,000 nautical miles. Its cargo fuel tank capacity 
ranges from approximately 950 to 1,400 bbl of JP-5 and is capable of delivering up to 2,000 
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gallons per minute to ashore units via hose reel. The FSV must be capable of replenishing 
cargo, ammunition, and fuel from PSVs and LAWs (USN, 2019a). 
C. LIGHT AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIP  
The LAW is the only military crewed and armored vessel in the family. It is also 
the only platform that is purpose-built for direct conveyance to the shore for roll on/ roll 
off capabilities. The LAW is similar in size to the PSV, but as a multipurpose warship, it 
exchanges a significant portion of cargo fuel capacity for passenger force space (USN, 
2020a). An example of a potential LAW design is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. LAW Prototype Illustration. Source: Eckstein (2020).  
Per the mission statement of the LAW Resources and Requirements Board,  
The LAW will complicate the enemies targeting by providing a highly 
maneuverable, mobile, independent, intra-theater range ship to complement 
the mix of traditional amphibious warfare ships. The LAW fills the gap in 
capability between the Navy’s large, multipurpose amphibious warships 
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and smaller landing craft, such as the Landing Craft Utility (LCU) and 
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC). (USN, 2020a)  
The LAW plays an integral role in the joint force transition to future operational concepts 
of DMO, LOCE, and EABO. 
For the scope of this project, the LAW’s primary mission is providing logistics 
support to ashore EABs. The LAW receives supplies from PSVs inside the WEZ and 
delivers to ashore-based EABs inside the WEZ. It is also capable of replenishing FSVs 
operating within the WEZ. The LAW’s key differentiating characteristic is its beach-able 
design capable of providing direct conveyance to shore for the onload and off-load of 
expeditionary forces, equipment, and supplies. It is also the only armored vessel that is 
militarily crewed with organic self-defense weapons. The LAW is capable of sustained 
speeds up to 22 knots with a range up to 6,500 nautical miles. Its cargo fuel tank holds 
approximately 2,100 bbl of JP-5 and is capable of delivering up to 600 gallons per minute 
to ashore units via multiple hose reels. The LAW must be capable of replenishing cargo, 
ammunition, and fuel from the CLF and PSVs (USN, 2020a). 
D. SUMMARY OF PLATFORMS 
Each vessel in the NGLS class has very distinct, differing capabilities. The PSV is 
the most capable in terms of capacity but does not have the survivability to operate deep 
within the WEZ. The FSV, while fast and agile, has minimal capacity and is only survivable 
due to its speed and small footprint. The LAW could technically handle all requirements, 
but its trade-off in design as a dual-purposed warship makes it highly inefficient for bulk 
fuel transport, with approximately one-tenth the cargo fuel capacity of a PSV. It is 
important to note that these key capabilities and limitations serve as the basis of constraints 
in our transshipment model.  
E. TOP-LEVEL OVERVIEW OF NODES 
The underlying importance within the operating concepts of DMO, LOCE, and 
EABO is a connected architecture that is heavily reliant on the ability to redistribute 
supplies, equipment, and troops. All vessels need to be capable of maneuvering from sea-
based to land-based nodes within the AO. As we seek to identify the optimal solution of 
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NGLS to transport fuel, the requirement for fuel within an AO “imposes three major types 
of costs: resources, capability reductions, and additional vulnerability” (Regnier et al., 
2015, p. 1). The NGLS family’s superior fuel redistribution capabilities are anticipated to 
become the enabling factor that will drive the force and create the speed and tempo that is 
required to maintain a competitive advantage over adversaries. That advantage is a result 
of the establishment and maneuverability of EABs and the SAGs. As near-peer adversaries 
create a tyranny of distance to overcome the U.S. joint maritime force, it is imperative that 
the Navy has the ability to connect sea-based and land-based nodes to turn operational 
energy into the operational capability required in executing these concepts (Regnier et al., 
2015). 
1. Expeditionary Advanced Bases  
The unique infrastructure of EABs enables rapid and highly mobile deployment of 
U.S. forces, creating a competitive advantage unable to be matched by adversaries. The 
EABs’ expeditionary footprint and operations make them challenging to identify and 
target, allowing the United States to grow capabilities within the WEZ (Corbett, 2018). 
This creates fewer vulnerabilities to the force because the force is less concentrated, 
(O’Rourke, 2020). The significance of EABs is that they are 
embedded within this scaled response from the Marine Corps and its 
inherent capability to be self-supporting on foreign shores. With the 
assistance of its sister service, the U.S. Navy, the Marines have, and 
continue to develop, methods to facilitate operations from the sea and 
follow-on operations ashore. (Strand, 2015, p. 1)  
In order to meet the maritime joint force demand, three specific types of EABs have been 
identified as providing essential supporting capabilities that have the capacity to be scaled 
to any size to challenge adversaries and create various opportunities within the WEZ. 
Those EABs are ASuWs, FARPs, and Logistics. 
a. Anti–Surface Warfare  
ASuW EABs create windows of opportunity to disrupt the adversary’s ability to 
achieve anti-access/area denial. “This forward-deployed and survivable capability will 
enhance the lethality of our naval forces and will help to deny our adversaries the use of 
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key maritime terrain” (Larter, 2020, para. 2). The extension of naval power from sea to 
land creates the integrated force that GEN David Berger mentions in his planning guidance 
(HQMC, 2019). The establishment of this land-based EAB creates freedom of movement 
within the littorals, thus enhancing the redistribution of supplies from node to node. This 
can be accomplished by characteristics of the PSV and the LAW. 
b. Forward Arming and Refueling Points  
FARPs are force multipliers because they are scalable and mobile, and they extend 
the lethality within an AO due to the ability to rearm and refuel in austere locations. The 
mission of a FARP is “to provide fuel and ordnance necessary for highly mobile and 
versatile helicopter, tiltrotor, and fixed-wing operations” (U.S. Marine Corps [USMC], 
2019). This diverse capability creates an extension of combat power from sea to shore. The 
significance of this EAB is the reduced turnaround time generated to maximize the amount 
of fuel within an aircraft before it enters the AO (USMC, 2019). FARPs can be staggered, 
established, and supplied through the versatility of the FSV and the beach-ability of the 
LAW.  
c. Logistics  
The future of warfighting is directly dependent on the maritime force’s ability to 
generate combat power through organic logistics. “The ability to provide logistic support 
to forward-deployed naval forces is essential in ensuring that these forces can remain on 
station indefinitely in any potential conflict” (Morse, 2008, p. 2). The capability to provide 
the full arrangement of classes of supply creates strategic opportunities for land-based 
forces to extend the distributed lethality. The austere environment in which these nodes are 
operational can be served by the fast agility and capability of the FSV to support the FSV’s 
dynamic demand signal.  
2. Surface Action Group  
The SAG is one of the versatile and flexible packages that the U. S. Navy organizes 
to support tactical missions in any maritime environment. Two of those missions that are 
critical in the execution of DMO, LOCE, and EABO are anti–surface warfare and anti–
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submarine warfare. These two packages provided by the SAG generate the distributed 
lethality that is necessary to deter adversaries, which “combines more powerful ships with 
innovative methods for employing them” (Richards, 2015, p. 4). The composition of a SAG 
for this model is comprised of three DDGs and one LCS, or three DDGs and one FFG(X). 
These collective capabilities enable the freedom of movement necessary to sustain and 
drive the joint maritime force in a contested environment. 
a. Guided Missile Destroyers  
DDGs are destroyers that “provide multi-mission capabilities, operating 
independently or as part of carrier strike groups, surface action groups, amphibious ready 
groups and replenishment groups” (Ingalls Shipbuilding, n.d.). In this scenario, a DDG’s 
capability is equally important to its capacity.  
By virtue of being larger, destroyers can more easily carry and generate the 
power for more powerful high-resolution radar and a larger number of 
vertical launch cells. They can thus provide theatre wide air and missile 
defense for forces such as a carrier battle group and typically serve this 
function. (Husseini, 2019)  
Being able to sustain longer missions within an AO creates less vulnerability during a 
potential resupply, which in turn means longer sustained operational capability. 
b. Frigate Guided Missile  
Although the FFG has similar capabilities to the LCS, the main difference is that 
they vary in size, which can become a limiting factor in execution in a contested 
environment. Due to FFGs being smaller, they are  
used as escort vessels to protect sea lines of communication or as an 
auxiliary component of a strike group whereas destroyers are generally 
integrated into carrier battle groups as the air defense component or utilized 
to provide territorial air and missile defense. (Husseini, 2019)  
In the context of DMO, depending on the package and capability that is required, an FFG’s 
low signature from its smaller size and onboard firepower must be accounted for, creating 
different opportunities of transport within the model. 
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c. Littoral Combat Ship 
The LCS has a unique capability within the maritime force because, unlike the FFG, 
it “is a modular, reconfigurable ship, with three types of Mission Packages: Surface 
Warfare (SUW) Mission Package, Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package, and 
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission Package” (U.S. Navy Office of Information, 
n.d.). The flexible packages provide the maritime force with mission capability near shore 
where agility and stealth are very important in contested waters to deter adversary forces 
and obtain key terrain to establish EABs.  
3. Summary of Nodes  
These nodes create a scalable, flexible, and lethal joint maritime force. “However, 
fulfilling our national strategy to support allies, deter aggressors, and—when necessary—
project power, has a fundamental but strategic requirement that we don’t explore enough: 
the availability of fuel whenever and wherever we need it” (Knepper & Singer, 2015, 
paragraph 1). These nodes, combined with the NGLS platforms, create the availability and 
redistribution of fuel that is required when and where it is needed. This is imperative as 
near-peer adversaries attempt to create a tyranny of distance to overcome for the joint 
maritime force, demanding the appropriate amount of PSVs, FSVs, and LAWs to sustain 
and drive the nodes’ capabilities. Thus, each node distributes specific supporting 
requirements in order to meet demand signals to achieve maritime superiority. After 
analyzing the nodes and the distinct capability of each NGLS platform, each capability 
generates restraints and constraints that can be distinctly defined as inputs for the 
transshipment model.  
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Our model was designed to provide OPNAV N4 with an unbiased, data-driven 
recommendation on the optimal NGLS composition to meet the future architecture of 
DMO and EABO. In collaboration with our advisors, Dr. Apte and Dr. Doerr, we 
developed a transshipment model with an objective function designed to minimize the 
number of deliveries necessary to support an aggregate resupply event. The end state goal 
was reduction of mission risk through the minimalization of deliveries within the WEZ. 
Figure 4 gives a visual representation of the model.  
 
Figure 4. NGLS Model Framework 
A. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
Due to the unclassified nature of this report, all parameters are hypothetical with 
intentionally approximated values. The supply and demand values are only placeholders to 
show the capability and scalability of the model.  






















1. Demand will be limited to fulfilling requirements from SAGs and EABs. 
SAG equates to afloat demand; EAB equates to ashore demand. 
2. Demand for one SAG is comprised of three DDGs and one LCS, or three 
DDGs and one FFG(X). 
3. EAB demand is broken down by specific EAB type, which includes 
ASuW strike units, STOVL FARP units, and maritime/naval logistics 
units. 
4. All fuel requirements—including ship, aviation, and ground—are 
consolidated into a single fuel requirement, JP-5, per OPNAV N4 
guidance. 
5. Ship selection is limited to the NGLS family of PSV, FSV, and LAW and 
is considered equally survivable in the model.  
6. PSVs cannot service EABs due to docking requirements. 
7. The CLF remains outside the WEZ and is the sole replenishment node 
from which NGLS assets draw fuel. (In this report, a node indicates a 
point of supply, a point of demand, or a transshipment point.) 
8. Replenishment of CLF assets are outside the scope of the project; 
therefore, fuel supply at the CLF is considered unconstrained. 
9. Vessel capacity is constrained by delivery capacity, which is calculated by 
the fuel transfer rate capable within a specified time window. 
These scope considerations play an integral role in the framework and design of the 
model. Specific transportation nodes and transportation arcs must first be designated in 
order to define the decision variables,  
1. Nodes 
A transportation node represents a specific point of supply, a point of demand, or a 
transshipment point. Each node location is considered an origin, transshipment, or 
destination location. An origin node is the starting point from which the resources 
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demanded are supplied. A transshipment node is simply a transfer point in which all 
outflows must be less than or equal to the capacity of the delivering vessel. No resources 
can be stored at the transshipment point; it solely represents transfer of resources (fuel) 
from one vessel to another. A destination node is the ending point where resources are 
required. It is important to note that a destination node will not be used as a transshipment 
or origin node in the model. It is assumed that all demand at a destination node is consumed 
solely by that node. The base model designates the following nodes. (The numbers 
correlate to the symbols in Figure 4.) 
1. CLF: origin node, provides fuel. This is where all fuel supply is drawn. 
Fuel supply at the CLF is unconstrained (unlimited). 
2. SAG: destination node, demands fuel.  
3. Transshipment: transshipment node, transfer point. Strictly a transfer 
activity in which all outflows must be less than or equal to the capacity of 
the delivering vessel. 
4. ASuW: destination node, demands fuel. 
5. FARP: destination node, demands fuel. 
6. Logistics (LOG): destination node, demands fuel. 
With the nodes established, the next step was to designate which vessel(s) could 
service each transportation arc. 
2. Arcs 
A transportation arc connects two nodes and can either be one-way or two-way (A. 
Apte, personal communication, January 15, 2020). This model exclusively utilizes one-
way arcs with all resources consumed at the destination node(s). The type of vessel that 
can service an arc is dependent on the arc’s location within the AO combined with the 
capabilities and limitations of the vessel. Below is a breakout of the vessel(s) capable of 
servicing each arc. 
• CLF to SAG = PSV 
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• CLF to Transshipment = PSV 
• Transshipment to ASuW = LAW or FSV 
• Transshipment to FARP = LAW or FSV 
• Transshipment to LOG = LAW or FSV 
It is important to note that while the LAW and the FSV can technically satisfy the 
requirements necessary to perform duties from the CLF to SAG or from CLF to 
Transshipment, operational and capacity constraints designate the PSV as the sole servicer 
of these nodes. On the contrary, the PSV cannot physically satisfy any of the 
Transshipment to EAB nodes due to its nonbeach-ability, relatively slow speed, and lack 
of armament and/or self-defense capability. 
3. Decision Variables 
The decision variables for this model are the number of deliveries by vessel (k) 
required to satisfy the demand from node (i) to node (j). The variables are as follows: 
• Ykij = number of deliveries by vessel (k) from node (i) to node (j)  
• k = vessel type (1 for PSV, 2 for FSV, 3 for LAW)  
• i = origination node (1 for CLF, 3 for Transshipment)  
• j = destination nodes (2 for SAG, 3 for Transshipment, 4 for ASuW, 5 for 
FARP, 6 for LOG) 
• Xkij = flow on vessel k from node i to node j (k, i, j defined as above) 
For instance, a PSV going from the CLF to the SAG would be depicted as Y112, 
while a LAW traveling from the Transshipment node to an ASuW node would be Y334. 
B. VESSEL CAPACITY AND DEMAND FIGURES 
The supply capacity of each vessel is based strictly off the (T) and (O) levels set 
forth in each vessel’s TLR documentation. The demand signal of each node was provided 
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by OPNAV N4 and does not fluctuate. While there is only one of each node represented, a 
multiplier can be used to scale to unlimited node variations. 
1. Threshold and Objective Supply Capacities 
The threshold and objective capacity of JP-5 fuel for each vessel is depicted in 
Table 1. Total capacity represents the maximum storage capacity of the vessel, and delivery 
capacity represents the maximum amount of fuel that can be transferred within the 
operational delivery time window. 
Table 1. Threshold and Objective Supply Capacity. Adapted from USN 
(2019a, 2019b). 







PSV 18,000 28,000 5,260 10,520 
FSV 950 1,400 950 1,400 
LAW 2,100 2,100 1,700 1,700 
Units: bbl (1 bbl = 42 U.S. gallons) 
 
2. Demand Requirements 
The demand requirements of each node were calculated per a single resupply event. 
A SAG has two variations: SAG 1 is comprised of three DDGs and one LCS, while SAG 
2 represents three DDGs and one FFG(X). Only SAG 1 demand is represented in the model, 
since it is the greater of the two and the variance did not result in a material difference. The 
ashore nodes of ASuW, FARP, and LOG remain constant. Demand at each node is 
represented in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Node Demand. Adapted from Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (OPNAV, 2020).  
Node Fuel Demand per Resupply Event 
SAG 1 18,250 




Units: bbl (1 bbl = 42 U.S. gallons) 
 
The key takeaways regarding supply capacities and demand data are twofold. First, 
the supply capacities for each vessel are constrained by an OPNAV N4–directed 
operational time window. A vessel can only transfer the stated delivery capacity of fuel per 
delivery, regardless of the vessel’s total carrying capacity. For instance, the PSV’s (T) 
delivery capacity is 5,260 bbl, even though its carrying capacity is 18,000 bbl. Therefore, 
the maximum amount of fuel a PSV can supply per delivery is 5,260 bbl. The second key 
takeaway relates to the demand data. The figures listed in Table 2 are for a single resupply 
event, and in order to forecast maximum operational tempo, the model is built to service 












The goal of our model was to provide OPNAV N4 with an unbiased, data-driven 
recommendation on the optimal NGLS composition necessary to satisfy future DMO 
requirements. Results are presented in four main categories:  
• deliveries with (T) capabilities, constrained  
• deliveries with (O) capabilities, constrained  
• deliveries with (T) capabilities, unconstrained   
• deliveries with (O) capabilities, unconstrained 
As stated previously, (T) specifications establish the lower bounds of acceptable 
performance, whereas (O) specifications set the upper bounds. Acquisition programs 
operate within this trade space to identify solutions capable of optimizing cost, schedule, 
and performance goals. Delivery constrained outputs limit the supply capacity of each 
vessel to the amount of fuel capable of being transferred within the operational time 
window. 
A. INTERPRETING DELIVERY NUMBER RESULTS 
The number of deliveries can be interpreted in two primary methods. First, if a 
mission dictates that demand be filled in surge fashion, in which all demand nodes are 
satisfied simultaneously, one trip would equate to one vessel. The quickest way to do that 
would be to have a separate vessel for each trip. For example, if four PSV deliveries were 
required along Arc X and two along Arc Y, the Navy would need a total of six PSVs. This 
would allow both nodes to be resupplied in parallel at the maximum speed possible. Speed 
and effectiveness greatly outweigh efficiency in this method. 
The second method for interpreting deliveries would be based off meeting demand 
in series, in which each vessel could make multiple deliveries. The only constraint on the 
number of deliveries per vessel would be the vessel’s total capacity divided by the demand 
of each event. For instance, a PSV at (T) capability can carry 18,000 bbl and would be 
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capable of satisfying three 5,260 bbl SAG resupply events (18,000 / 5,260 = 3.2) in an 
unconstrained scenario. However, this does not mean one PSV has to satisfy all three 
demands. A second PSV could perform two deliveries while the original PSV only 
performs one. This method should be pursued if cost and efficiency are the top priority.  
1. Deliveries with (T) Capabilities, Constrained 
Results modeled at (T) capabilities with an operationally constrained time window 
are shown in Table 3. The parameters resulted in 12 total deliveries, the largest amount of 
all scenarios.  
Table 3. Deliveries Required at (T) Capabilities, Constrained 







PSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 Y112 18,000 5,260 4 
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 Y113 18,000 5,260 2 
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 Y234 950 950 0 
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 Y235 950 950 0 
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 Y236 950 950 1 
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 Y334 2,100 1,700 1 
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 Y335 2,100 1,700 4 
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 Y336 2,100 1,700 0 




Total Combined Deliveries 12 
 
The increased delivery count was driven primarily by the low fuel transfer rate of 
the PSV. As depicted in Table 3, the PSV’s (T) delivery capacity of 5,260 bbl is 
approximately one third of the vessel’s total fuel capacity of 18,000 bbl. This means that 
the PSV can only expend approximately 30% of its stores on each delivery. The second 
contributing factor was the reduced transfer rate of the LAW, which constrained its 
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carrying capacity of 2,100 bbl down to 1,700 bbl. Total deliveries required per vessel were 
PSV = 6, FSV = 1, and LAW = 5. 
2. Deliveries with (O) Capabilities, Constrained 
Results modeled at (O) capabilities with an operationally constrained time window 
are shown in Table 4. The parameters resulted in nine total deliveries, a reduction of three 
from the previous scenario. 
Table 4. Deliveries Required at (O) Capabilities, Constrained 







PSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 Y112 28,000 10,520 2 
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 Y113 28,000 10,520 1 
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 Y234 1,400 1,400 0 
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 Y235 1,400 1,400 0 
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 Y236 1,400 1,400 1 
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 Y334 2,100 1,700 1 
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 Y335 2,100 1,700 4 
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 Y336 2,100 1,700 0 




Total Combined Deliveries 9 
 
PSV deliveries required along Arc Y112 and Y113 were reduced by 50% as 
compared to deliveries necessary at (T) capabilities. Arc Y112 was reduced from four 
deliveries to two, and Arc Y113 was reduced from two to one. This was directly correlated 
to the 100 % increase in the fuel transfer rate from 5,260 bbl (T) capability to 10,520 bbl 
(O) capability. It is important to note that while the transfer rate did increase 100%, delivery 
capacity still accounted for less than 40% of the PSV’s total fuel carrying capacity. The 
only other material change in the data was the FSV’s increased delivery capacity from 950 
bbl to 1,400 bbl. However, this did not change the composition of deliveries, as the FSV’s 
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1,400 bbl delivery capacity remained inferior to the 1,700 bbl delivery capacity of the 
LAW. 
3. Deliveries with (T) Capabilities, Unconstrained 
Results modeled at (T) capabilities with an unconstrained delivery time window are 
shown in Table 5. These parameters resulted in eight total deliveries, a reduction of one 
delivery from the (O) constrained scenario and a reduction of four deliveries from the (T) 
constrained scenario. 
Table 5. Deliveries Required at (T) Capabilities, Unconstrained 







PSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 Y112 18,000 18,000 2 
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 Y113 18,000 18,000 1 
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 Y234 950 950 0 
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 Y235 950 950 0 
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 Y236 950 950 1 
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 Y334 2,100 2,100 1 
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 Y335 2,100 2,100 3 
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 Y336 2,100 2,100 0 




Total Combined Deliveries 8 
 
The key difference when transitioning from a constrained to an unconstrained 
model is that each vessel’s delivery capacity is no longer bound by its fuel transfer rate. As 
shown in Table 5, fuel capacity is now set equal to capacity per delivery. This has the most 
significant impact on the PSV, as it is only capable of transferring approximately one third 
of its fuel within the (O) and (T) constrained environments.  
Even with the significant increase in PSV delivery capacity, the number of 
deliveries for PSVs remained equal to the results of the (O) constrained environment. The 
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reduction in total delivery count is solely the result of the LAW’s increased delivery 
capacity of 2,100 bbl (up from 1,700 bbl). This reduces the number of deliveries required 
along Arc Y335 from four down to three. Overall, the total number of combined deliveries 
is approximately 33% less in an unconstrained environment as compared to vessels built 
to the same TLRs operating in a constrained environment. 
4. Deliveries with (O) Capabilities, Unconstrained 
Results modeled at (O) capabilities with an unconstrained delivery time window 
are shown in Table 6. These parameters required seven total deliveries, which was the 
minimum of all scenarios. This is a reduction of one delivery from the (T) unconstrained 
scenario and a reduction of two deliveries from the (O) constrained scenario. 
Table 6. Deliveries Required at (O) Capabilities, Unconstrained 







PSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 Y112 28,000 28,000 1 
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 Y113 28,000 28,000 1 
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 Y234 1,400 1,400 0 
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 Y235 1,400 1,400 0 
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 Y236 1,400 1,400 1 
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 Y334 2,100 2,100 1 
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 Y335 2,100 2,100 3 
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 Y336 2,100 2,100 0 




Total Combined Deliveries 7 
 
Gains in the PSV’s fuel capacity from the lower bounds of 5,260 bbl modeled in 
the first scenario to 28,000 bbl modeled in this scenario produced noteworthy results. 
Deliveries along Arc Y112 were reduced from four to one, a reduction of 75 %, and from 
two deliveries to one along Arc Y113, a reduction of 50%. This translates to one PSV being 
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able to satisfy all demand at a SAG and one PSV being able to satisfy all demand at the 
Transshipment node. Neither the FSV nor the LAW experienced additional gains when 
increasing from (T) to (O) capabilities in the unconstrained environment.  
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Our findings show that the number of deliveries varies significantly based on the 
TLR level and the constraints of the environment. As shown in Figure 5, the maximum 
number of deliveries, 12, occurred when the vessels were modeled at their (T) capabilities 
and bound by a time constraint. The minimum number of deliveries, seven, occurred when 
the vessels were modeled at their (O) capabilities and not bound by an operational time 
constraint. The difference between the maximum and the minimum results equates to an 
approximate 42% decrease in the number of required deliveries.  
  
Figure 5. Total Aggregate Deliveries per Capability Scenario 
1. Comparing Vessel Deliveries per Capability and Constraint Scenario 
The vessel that experienced the greatest variance was the PSV. Progressive 
increases in the PSV’s delivery capacity from scenario (T) constrained to (O) 
unconstrained accounted for four of the five aggregate delivery reductions. Delivery 
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capacity increases were directly attributed to changes in the vessel’s fuel transfer rate and 
total fuel capacity. The PSV’s fuel transfer rate doubled from 5,260 bbl at (T) capability to 
10,520 bbl at (O) capability, whereas its fuel capacity increased from 18,000 bbl to 28,000 
bbl. 
The LAW was the only other vessel that experienced a reduction in deliveries 
throughout the four scenarios. Its total delivery count went from five to four, reducing the 
aggregate total by one. This decrease is only possible in unconstrained scenarios, as it was 
solely a factor of the increased fuel capacity from 1,700 bbl at (T) to 2,100 bbl at (O) 
capability. It is important to note that while its fuel capacity increased, the fuel transfer rate 
remained constant at both TLR levels, so there was no benefit from the larger fuel capacity 
when operating in a constrained environment.  
 
Figure 6. Vessel Deliveries per Capability Scenario 
 
PSV FSV LAW
(T) Constrained 6 1 5
(O) Constrained 3 1 5
(T) Unconstrained 3 1 4
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The FSV did not experience any change in delivery count even with an approximate 
47% increase in delivery capacity from (T) to (O) capabilities. This is primarily driven by 
the fact that its increased (O) capacity of 1,400 bbl is still lesser than the 1,700 bbl capacity 
of LAW with which it directly competes. 
2. Effects of TLR Level and Constraint on Delivery Capacity 
As stated previously, delivery requirements vary substantially based on the 
combination of TLR capabilities and the operating environment. These changes measured 
as the difference in delivery capacity between scenarios are depicted in Table 7. For 
example, the PSV’s delivery capacity increased 432% from 5,260 bbl at (T) constrained to 
28,000 bbl at (O) unconstrained ([28,000 - 5,260] / 5,260 = 4.32). Conversely, the FSV and 
the LAW experienced a lesser 47% and 24% delivery capacity improvement from the lower 
to upper bound.  
Table 7. Changes in Delivery Capacity between Scenarios 
Arc Description (T) C to (O) C (T) C to (T) U (O) C to (T) U (O) C to (O) U (T) C to (O) U 
PSV from CLF 1 
to SAG 2 100% 242% 71% 166% 432% 
PSV from CLF 1 
to Trans 3 100% 242% 71% 166% 432% 
FSV from Trans 3 
to ASuW 4 47% 0% -32% 0% 47% 
FSV from Trans 3 
to FARP 5 47% 0% -32% 0% 47% 
FSV from Trans 3 
to LOG 6 47% 0% -32% 0% 47% 
LAW from Trans 3 
to ASuW 4 0% 24% 24% 24% 24% 
LAW from Trans 3 
to FARP 5 0% 24% 24% 24% 24% 
LAW from Trans 3 
to LOG 6 0% 24% 24% 24% 24% 
TLR: (T) = Threshold, (O) = Objective  
Environment: C = Constrained, U = Unconstrained  
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3. Alternate Optimal Solution for FSV and LAW 
It is important to note that the FSV and the LAW provide a one-to-one alternate 
optimal solution for deliveries from the Transshipment node to both ASuW and LOG nodes 
in all four scenarios. This is because the demand requirement at each node of 100 bbl is 
less than both platforms’ absolute minimum delivery capacity of 950 bbl for FSV and 1,700 
bbl for LAW. However, due to anticipated roll on/ roll off operational requirements at 
ASuW nodes, the FSV would not be capable of servicing ASuW nodes. On the contrary, 
the LAW is more than capable of servicing LOG nodes, meaning one LAW could replace 
the one FSV identified to service LOG 6 in each scenario. This would result in all ashore 
nodes being serviced by the LAW, fully eliminating the need for the FSV. We highly 
recommend OPNAV N4 conduct further research into the cost effectiveness and 
efficiencies that could be gained by reducing the NGLS family from three platforms to two. 
4. Analysis Summary 
The summary findings in Figure 6 and Table 7 provide OPNAV N4 with valuable 
planning and forecasting information. Figure 6 is instrumental in identifying the upper and 
lower bounds of deliveries across all scenarios, whereas Table 7 highlights the variances 
in TLR tradespace based on the operating environment. Summary analysis for each vessel 
is as follows. 
• The PSV shows the greatest spread in delivery count based on its TLR 
targets and operating constraints. Barring cost and sustainment 
information, the PSV should be targeted for procurement at its (O) TLR 
capabilities. In addition, OPNAV N4 should also seek courses of action 
that reduce or eliminate the delivery time constraints.  
• The LAW’s ability to affect delivery count is solely a factor of its 
operating environment. We infer that there is no gain in targeting solutions 
above the LAW’s (T) TLR targets. OPNAV N4 must identify courses of 
action that reduce or eliminate time constraints in order to achieve the 
depicted reduction in deliveries.  
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• The FSV delivery count is not affected by the FSV’s TLR level or the 
operating environment. We infer that there is no positive impact in 
procurement above the FSV’s (T) TLR targets. Additionally, since the 
FSV’s upper bounds of delivery capacity of 1,400 bbl is inferior to the 
lower bounds of the LAW’s 1,700 bbl delivery capacity, the LAW will 
always be the preferred vessel for demands greater than 1,400 bbl. 
• Alternate optimum solution: The LAW is capable of replacing the FSV 
in all scenarios. Further research should be conducted on the potential 
benefits/drawbacks of eliminating the FSV from the NGLS family. 
Table 7 should be closely reviewed by each platform’s program manager to identify 
the trade-offs associated with differing TLR levels and each vessel’s anticipated operating 
environment. For instance, removing the operational time constraint of a PSV at (T) 
capabilities results in 71% greater delivery capacity as compared to a PSV at (O) capability 
in a constrained environment (labeled as column “(O) C to (T) U” in Table 7). This means 
the Navy could save significant money on acquisition and life-cycle costs if able to mitigate 
time constraints and still meet demand with lower TLR capabilities. Additionally, Table 7 
gives planners a general recommendation on potential asset allocation and prioritization by 
highlighting the platforms and scenarios that produce the greatest capacity improvements.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Future amphibious operations will be intense and fought over vast distances. U.S. 
armed forces will be susceptible to enemy actions well before arriving into the AO. Having 
the ability to sustain forces from within the WEZ allows for rapid response to multiple 
locations simultaneously and extends the range and capability of sustainment forces. In 
order to operate in contested environments, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps need to 
continue to build upon capacity while reducing constraints within our platforms in order to 
sustain operations and survive within the adversary’s WEZ. The ability of the Navy and 
Marine Corps to conduct future amphibious operations is directly proportional to their 
ability to leverage capacity. 
Due to the advancements in technology and the adversary’s ability to fight in multi-
domain environments, future warfare will escalate quickly and will result in consuming 
resources—specifically fuel—at quicker rates. This requires sustainment capabilities that 
are agile, responsive, and able to survive enemy interdiction. In order to properly posture 
forces against the pacing threat of the great power competition of China and Russia, the 
Navy and Marine Corps should seek to close distances and allow for enhanced sustainment 
of the amphibious forces so they do not place forces at risk from culmination. 
A. CONCLUSION 
Our model was designed to provide OPNAV N4 with an unbiased, data-driven 
recommendation on the optimal NGLS composition necessary to meet fuel requirements 
of distributed operations in a contested environment. We developed a transshipment model 
with an objective function designed to minimize the number of deliveries required to 
support an aggregate resupply event. The end state goal was the reduction of mission risk 
through the minimization of deliveries within the WEZ. The NGLS platforms assessed in 
our model were the fast supply vessel (FSV), the platform supply vessel (PSV), and the 
light amphibious warship (LAW). 
Our findings show that the number of deliveries varies significantly based on the 
TLR level of the vessel and the constraints of the environment. The maximum number of 
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deliveries, 12, occurred when the vessels were modeled at their (T) capabilities and bound 
by a time constraint. The minimum number of deliveries, seven, occurred when the vessels 
were modeled at their (O) capabilities and not bound by an operational time constraint. The 
difference between the maximum and minimum results equates to an approximate 42% 
decrease in the number of required deliveries. The most significant improvement in 
capability—and thus delivery reduction—was captured by the PSV; its delivery capacity 
increased 432% from 5,260 bbl at (T) constrained to 28,000 bbl at (O) unconstrained. The 
FSV and the LAW experienced a lesser 47% and 24% delivery capacity improvement from 
the lower to upper bound. In addition, the model identified that the FSV and the LAW 
provide an alternate optimum solution for ashore demand (based strictly on capacity 
requirements).  
These findings provide OPNAV N4 with an unbiased assessment of the opportunity 
costs associated with each platform’s trade space and correlating effects of the operational 
environment. The number of deliveries can be reduced through acquisitioning to higher 
TLRs or removing the operational time constraints, or the number of deliveries can be 
maximized by a combination of both. However, the PSV showed the greatest variance 
between upper and lower bound capacity and should thus get prioritization of effort and 
resources. These efforts will require both fiscal and doctrinal efforts, as no amount of 
money can simply remove the operational constraint. 
B. FUTURE WORK  
This research was designed to find the optimal number of NGLS vessels within a 
contested environment. As the sponsor receives more information about the costs for each 
ship, this model could be expanded to include the acquisition costs associated with each 
vessel. This would create an objective function of minimizing costs to assist the 
Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps to purchase the ships that not only provide 
utility through deliveries but also those that are the most economically feasible. 
The operational time constraint is a significant variable that should be continuously 
reviewed. It effectively limits each vessel’s delivery capacity to the fuel transfer rate 
capable of being achieved within the designated time window. Therefore, in the case of the 
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PSV at (T) operating in a constrained environment, its delivery capacity of 5,260 bbl is less 
than one third of its total fuel capacity of 18,000 bbl. Therefore, OPNAV N4 needs to 
continuously review this service-imposed constraint and assess whether options exist to 
mitigate it with current resources. For instance, can a SAG comprised of three DDGs and 
one LCS not provide enough protection to support an unimpeded fuel resupply event? 
In addition, our model did not include the load and unload times to the ASuW, 
FARP, and Logistic nodes. This could alter the number of vessels required to meet demand 
and potentially increase risk of exposure due to the number of vessels that would be 
required. As these nodes increase and move within the contested AO, it is imperative to 
look at how the load and unload times could affect the placement of these nodes within the 
scenario. 
C. SUMMARY  
This study assesses the optimal type and quantity of NGLS deliveries necessary to 
supply the force with the fuel demanded as outlined by the OPNAV N4 staff. It focuses on 
the vessels and their ability to sustain nodes within the WEZ. We created a transshipment 
network that could be modeled mathematically. The model provided a large framework for 
determining the deliveries required within the designed network architecture of DMO and 
EABO. Based on the assumptions and constraints used in the model, the results reveal 
flexibility for the sponsor to determine how they want to minimize the risk and exposure 
that are often present in logistic operations.  
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APPENDIX.  MODEL OUTPUTS 
A. MODEL (T) CAPABILITIES—CONSTRATINED 
 
 




C. MODEL (T) CAPABILITIES—UNCONSTRAINED 
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